In December 1986, R A D C initiated a microcircuit a n d hybrid field return and failure analysis program. D a t a from t h a t program along with case studies from e a c h of t h e t h r e e major failure categories a r e presented. Emphasis is placed on microcircuit failures t h a t were t h e result of design, fabrication and assembly defects. The purpose of t h e R A D C work is t o lay t h e groundwork for a DoD parts return and failure analysis program and t o demonstrate t h e importance of analyzing field failures.
INTRODUCTION
There is a serious lack of useful microcircuit field d a t a available t o industry a n d government. Microcircuit field failures from military systems a r e usually discarded or sent f o r precious m e t a l recovery.
Repair centers d o not normally analyze field failures.
Only in t h e e v e n t of a catastrophe do part vendors hear about failures from m a t u r e operational weapon systems. R A D C in December of 1986 initiated a n inhouse program to remedy this situation. This program is designed t o provide feedback t o semiconductor manufacturers and identify t h e root causes of field failures so intelligent corrective actions c a n b e implemented. The program objective is to establish within the DoD a mechanism t h a t provides field returns, failure analysis, feedback to industry/government and implements cost effective solutions.
A discussion on t h e deficiencies in t h e military field d a t a system, t h e importance of failure analysis and guidelines f o r implementing a DoD program were presented in a n earlier paper (1) . The purpose of this paper i s t o present t h e current technical d a t a collected, emphasizing those parts t h a t had latent defects leading t o microcircuit failure in fielded Air Force weapon systems.
DESCRIPTION OF DATA
All the parts analyzed were actual field failures from operational Air Force avionic equipment such as; radars, electronic warfare equipment and navigational systems. Most of t h e parts were collected at Robins AFB GA a n d Hill AFB UT -two primary Air F o r c e repair depots. About one thousand parts were collected during C Y 1987 a n d thirty failure analysis reports issued. The d a t a represent a variety of part types, including microprocessors, memories, power IC's and various hybrid components. The results of t h e analyses a r e categorized into three main areas:
I C Design Fabrication and Assembly, System Application, and R e t e s t OK (RTOK). Curently 19% of t h e field failures fall into t h e category of IC Design, Fabrication a n d Assembly. These a r e t h e parts with inherent flaws o r latent d e f e c t s manifested as field failures. About 55% of t h e failures fall into t h e System Application category. These failures a r e unique to t h e system they failed in.
Electrical overstress due to poor system design or improper maintenance procedures a r e t h e principal causes of failures in this category. R e t e s t OK is t h e third category, comprising 24% of t h e t o t a l population.
Cracked solder joints, inaccurate diagnostics a n d intermittents a r e s o m e of t h e causes f o r these type failures. Failure analysis of discrete components a n d circuit cards m a k e up t h e remaining 290 Non-Microcircuit category. The pie graph in Figure   I shows a breakout of t h e field data. A microprocessor used in t h e Doppler radar of a s t r a t e g i c bomber was found t o b e failing in t h e field at a g r e a t e r than 50% rate. A t least half of t h e t i m e this radar was returned f o r repair, t h e microprocessor was found faulty and replaced. In some cases t h e failure could only be reproduced a f t e r five or ten minutes of operation, suggesting a t e m p e r a t u r e dependent problem. The microprocessor is mounted on a circuit c a r d t h a t runs hot and probably saw at least 3000 t e m p e r a t u r e cycles prior t o failure. Of t h e nineteen parts analyzed, six had cracks. Three of t h e c r a c k s were internal t o t h e device. Two of t h e cracks were near t h e o u t p u t pins. One crack occurred at t h e corner of t h e die and correlated with some large die a t t a c h voids underneath t h e die. The die corner was not attached. Figure 2 shows t h e void extending t o t h e edge of t h e die and t h e underside of t h e corner piece t h a t has been flipped over. The die is 274 X 276 mils and is a t t a c h e d using a Au-Si eutectic. Figure 3 shows t h e X-ray of t h e die a t t a c h taken prior t o delidding.
Figure 2 SEM photomicrograph of t h e die a t t a c h underneath t h e cracked corner. Note t h e large void t h a t extends o u t t o t h e die edge.

The analysis showed t h a t voids in t h e die a t t a c h , especially voids t h a t extend o u t t o t h e edges of large
a r e a silicon die, c a n cause microcircuits t o failure in military aircraft.
The p a r t manufacturer, who had already made some improvements in his die a t t a c h process, found t h e feedback invaluable. This t y p e of die a t t a c h process is common t o a wide variety of p a r t
types. It was therefore important t o t h e manufacturer t o see how t h e voiding correlated with t h e reliability of t h e p a r t in a military application.
There is not an X-ray requirement for Class B devices. But e v e n if this was a Class S device, it may not have been a rejectable condition based on t h e Xray, which only shows t h e presence or absence of gold in t h e e u t e c t i c die bond. It appears from this example t h a t improving t h e screens for die a t t a c h in Class B devices is warranted. New analytical techniques based on acoustic wave propagation and t h e thermal h e a t transfer properties of t h e die bond a r e being developed and may in t h e future provide a quick check for die a t t a c h integrity during t h e manufacturing process of Class B devices. 
Aluminum Metal Line Failure
A 16 bit Ultraviolet Read Only Memory used in a f i r e control radar on t h e F-16 fighter a i r c r a f t was found t o have a high failure rate. "Missing d a t a bits" was t h e reported failure mode in t h e repair center. A different d a t a bit failed e a c h time. Four failures were carefully removed and sent t o RADC for analysis. A voltage contrast SEM technique was used t o identify t h e failure site. Figure 4 shows t h e cracks which w e r e found randomly on the metallization runs and were clearly t h e cause f o r missing d a t a bits.
The aluminum line is approximately four microns wide. Stress cracking of t h e conductor line caused by poor process control was t h e reason for failure. The device was manufactured during 1980 using NMOS technology. It is estimated t h e p a r t experienced 2016 power cycles prior t o failure, based on 35 hours of operation per month, o n e hour and 20 minutes average flight time, etc. The a i r c a f t during this t i m e period was exposed t o documented min and max temperatures of -50°F and 170°F, respectively. A CIDEP Alert (#F9-A-83-01) was issued f o r this family of p a r t s in 1983. The p a r t manufacturer, who is no longer in business, took some corrective actions but p a r t s a r e still failing in t h e field.
The Air Force no longer procures this product and is taking steps t o c o r r e c t t h e problem in t h e fielded units.
An organized field return and failure analysis program would have in this case prevented many "field failures".
Early feedback would have provided t h e manufacturer and t h e DoD t h e timely information needed t o fix t h e problem. Even though t h e Air F o r c e monitors GIDEP reports, i t is not a fail-safe system. Figure 4 . Cracked m e t a l lines due t o manufacturing control problems such a s high silicon c o n t e n t in t h e aluminum m e t a l lines. An operational amplifier t h a t drives t h e HeadsUp-Display in t h e F-15 fighter a i r c r a f t was identified for failure analysis because of i t s high removal rate. It is a 3-resistor, 3-transistor, plastic-potted 8-pin cylindrical component. The failure mode was described a s an intermittent. The repair technician reproduced t h e failure mode by simply tapping on t h e device. Figure 5 shows t h e device with t h e plastic potting etched away.
Careful e l e c t r i c a l testing before and a f t e r t h e plastic was etched away allowed for isolation of t h e defective solder joint.
The cracked joint occurred where t h e lead from t h e TO c a n is soldered t o t h e package post.
The extrerne stress conditions of t h e field environment is what caused t h e solder joint to eventually fail.
At 50,000 feet t h e ambient t e m p e r a t u r e could easily be -5OOC and t h e F-15 a i r c r a f t probably makes t h a t climb in less than five minutgs.
An a i r c r a f t sitting idle on t h e hot blacktop sees 50 C plus temperatures. During one mission, this p a r t may experience ten 100°C thermal cycles. If t h e a i r c r a f t averages 500 hours a year and t h e average flight t i m e is 45 minutes, then this part would b e exposed t o 6,250 thermal cycles a year or 62,500 cycles in t e n years. The part is also exposed to continuous vibration. Was this p a r t designed t o withstand this type of abuse? Although designed t o o p e r a t e over t h e military t e m p e r a t u r e range, t h e part manufacturer's specification specifically states..."Do not expose this module t o excessive shock, vibration or moisture". In this c a s e t h e repair center, working in cooperation with t h e p a r t manufacturer, is considering design changes t o remedy t h e situation. As is often t h e case, t h e original part manufacturer did not understand t h e final use environment for his product.
A large number of bipolar s t a t i c RAMS from a n electronic engine control w e r e failing in a depot screening procsdure. The equipment would soak f o r 30 minutes at -60 F and then t h e memories would fail t o o p e r a t e during power up. A percentage of p a r t s would work a t slightly higher temperatures. The p a r t s failed t o work because of t h e t e m p e r a t u r e dependence of t h e transistor characteristics in bipolar devices, a failure known as "cold start". An e f f e c t i v e piece p a r t screen exists f o r this t y p e of failure. The problem h a s been eliminated by puchasing only those p a r t s t h a t have been properly screened by t h e original p a r t manufacturer.
Other Field Failure Analyses
Currently under investigation a r e a number of power transistors in which t h e failures appear t o b e caused by corrosion of t h e Pb-In solder d i e a t t a c h . In addition, several different types of UV and EE ROM's a r e being analyzed because of a memory retention problem.
The devices w e r e built using NMOS technology and t h e field failures appear t o b e caused by g a t e oxides t h a t fail t o retain a charged state. A IK CMOS s t a t i c RAM, built t o a source control drawing, is under evaluation because of high leakage c u r r e n t s t h a t draw down t h e b a t t e r y back-up when t h e a i r c r a f t is not in use. A number of hybrid F A reports a r e also nearing completion where quality and workmanship problems appear t o b e t h e primary causes of failure. Problems such as improper wire bonding, poor a t t a c h of c e r a m i c substrates, and defective lid seals were identified.
SYSTEM APPLICATION FAILURES
As shown in t h e pie c h a r t of Figure 1 , most of t h e parts analyzed so f a r have failed because they have been electrically overstressed or burned o u t in t h e system. The failures a r e unique system application problems. The e l e c t r i c a l overstress is caused by poor system design, e r r a t i c power supplies or improper maintenance/operational procedures.
In one or two case studies t h e observed failures had damage t h a t resembled classical e l e c t r o s t a t i c discharge (ESD), however t h e r e was no conclusive evidence t h a t ESD was t h e primary cause of t h e field failure.
In o n e case, a power hybrid device used in a sophisticated electronic w a r f a r e pod was tagged for failure analysis because of a n extremely high removal rate. Seventeen p a r t s were analyzed and in each case t h e failure mode was t h e same, namely, t h e output waveform was clipped. Visual inspection showed t h a t t h e output transistor in each was blown a s shown in Figure 6 . A voltage controlled oscillator used on t h e s a m e printed wiring board was identified a s t h e source of t h e electrical overstress. An overvoltage protection device is being considered t o solve t h e problem and will significantly improve t h e reliability of t h e fielded system. Additionally, as a result of t h e feedback, t h e hybrid manufacturer considered replacing t h e output transistor with one t h a t had more current/voltage handling capacity. Information about this failure and others from t h e s a m e system was used in reviewing t h e next generation design f o r this system. Figure 6 . Burned aluminum c o n t a c t s on an output transistor used in a power hybrid device.
RETEST OK
Nothing is m o r e frustrating than trying t o understand why a piece of avionic equipment r e t e s t s OK in t h e repair center, a f t e r having been identified as a failure in t h e field and removed from t h e operational aircraft. In many cases t h e system RTOK's because t h e individual piece p a r t s resume normal operation in t h e benign environment of t h e repair depot. There a r e a variety of reasons why a p a r t might r e t e s t OK a f t e r being diagnosed as a failure.
In many cases t h e environmental conditions (e.g. temperature/vibration) t h a t precipitated t h e failure cannot b e reproduced. Failure isolation problems, software bugs, t e s t e r correlation problems and defective solder joints a r e just a few more reasons why t h e pie c h a r t (Figure 1) shows a 24 percent RTOK.
In one case study a high speed J-FET switch was c i t e d as having a 75% failure r a t e in a nighttime imaging c a m e r a on t h e 6-52 bomber. RADC verified through electrical testing t h a t t h e parts fully complied with t h e source control drawing specification. The problem was one of poor systems spec writing. A 75 ohm (measured on-resistance) FET which was designed into t h e system would not o p e r a t e properly. To solve t h e problem, t h e p a r t manufacturer generously offered to exchange t h e product with a 30 ohm FET. But i t was t h e engineers a t Robins AFB working t o understand t h e cause of failure t h a t led t o t h e corrective actions.
In many cases i t is just a s important t o know t h a t a p a r t didn't fail a s i t is t o know how it failed. In this case, t h e problem would have never been found without detailed e l e c t r i c a l testing and feedback t o t h e original p a r t manufacturer.
SUMMARY
This paper reports on RADC's year long e f f o r t t o collect and analyze microcircuit field failures. A brief description of t h e source of d a t a a n d a relative breakdown of t h e failure categories were presented. Case studies from e a c h were described t o illustrate t h e importance of a DoD field return and failure analysis program.
The benefits of a field return program a r e twofold. First, t h e part manufacturer receives valuable feedback concerning t h e end use and environmental conditions t h a t his product sees in fielded systems, permitting improved reliability in future product designs. Secondly, t h e military gains a n understanding of t h e root causes of field failures and can c a r r y o u t t h e corrective actions t h a t lead t o improvements in t h e reliability of fielded equipment.
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